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Rover and Out? Globalisation, the West Midlands Auto Cluster, and  
the end of MG Rover  
David Bailey, Seiji Kobayashi and Stewart MacNeill
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Forthcoming, Policy Studies 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper sets the scene for this Policy Studies special issue on plant closures by 
outlining the form of the auto cluster in the West Midlands, the nature of structural 
changes unfolding in the industry, and the decline and eventual collapse of MG Rover 
(MGR). Structural changes highlighted include: greater pressure on firms to recover 
costs when technological change has been intensifying, driving up the costs of new 
model development; increased international sourcing of modular components; and a 
shift of final assembly operations towards lower cost locations. All of these make 
maintaining mature clusters such as the West Midlands more challenging for firms 
and policy makers. The paper then looks a „what went wrong‟ at MGR. Given long 
run problems at the firm and its inability to recover costs, BMW‟s sale of the firm in 
2000 left MGR virtually dead on its feet, and by 2002/3 it was clear to many that the 
firm was running out of time. Whilst recognising that the firm‟s demise was 
ultimately a long-term failure of management, the paper also looks at other 
contributing factors, including government policy mistakes over the years, such as the 
misguided „national champions‟ approach in the 1950s and 1960s, a failure to 
integrate activities under nationalisation in the 1970s, a mistaken privatisation to 
British Aerospace in the 1980s, and a downside of competition policy in „allowing‟ 
the sale to a largely inappropriate owner in BMW in the 1990s. The considerable 
volatility of sterling in recent years hastened the firm‟s eventual demise.  
 
Keywords: Automotive industry; Globalisation; West Midlands; MG Rover; 
Industrial Policy. 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The structural changes and shifts unfolding in the auto industry have been vividly 
illustrated through recent events in the West Midlands. These have included the 
collapse of MG Rover in 2005 and closures of Jaguar‟s Brown‟s Lane plant in 
Coventry and Peugeot‟s Ryton plant. Add in continuing uncertainty over the future of 
the Jaguar and Land Rover plants given (at the time of writing) Ford‟s attempt to sell-
off the brands owing to ongoing losses at Jaguar, and fears over a „meltdown‟ of 
assembly activity in the region seem justified. These events have also highlighted the 
difficulties involved in supporting and developing the auto „cluster‟ in the region.  
 
This paper explores the background to the MG Rover (MGR) collapse and sets the 
scene for this special issue. In section 2 it outlines the form of the auto cluster in the 
West Midlands, putting this into broader context by examining structural changes in 
the industry. These include: greater pressure on firms to recover costs when 
technological change has been intensifying, driving up the costs of new model 
development; increasingly global sourcing; and the growth of assembly operations in 
lower cost locations in South and Eastern Europe. All of these make maintaining the 
West Midlands cluster both more necessary and yet also more difficult for policy 
makers.  
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The paper then looks a „what went wrong‟ at MGR, agreeing with the analysis of 
Holweg and Oliver (2005) which stressed long term problems, the „cycle of doom‟ at 
the firm and its inability to recover costs for new model development. Given this 
position, BMW‟s sale of the firm in 2000 left MGR in an unsustainable position, with 
only a very limited time horizon in which to find an investment partner. Indeed, by 
2002/3 it was clear that the firm was running out of time. The paper goes further, 
however, and examines wider environmental factors contributing to the demise of 
MGR, in particular government policy mistakes over the years, including a misguided 
„national champions‟ approach involving forced mergers in the 1950s and 1960s, a 
failure to integrate activities under nationalisation in the 1970s, a mistaken 
privatisation to British Aerospace in the 1980s, and a clear downside of competition 
policy which resulted in the sale to an inappropriate owner in BMW in the 1990s. Add 
in the considerable volatility of sterling in recent years, and the firm‟s eventual 
demise came as no surprise to many analysts.  
 
2. THE WEST MIDLANDS AUTO „CLUSTER‟ IN A RESTRUCTURING 
GLOBAL INDUSTRY 
Shifts in the Global Auto Industry 
In the course of its history the auto industry has arguably undergone radical changes 
described as three “revolutions” by Womack et al (1990), the first two being the 
introduction of assembly line production by Ford and so-called „lean production‟ by 
Toyota.
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 In the past four decades, further radical changes have affected the entire 
value chain, from manufacturers and suppliers to service providers and dealers 
(Chanaron 2004, MacNeill and Chanaron 2005)
3
 and, since the mid-1990s, a „third 
revolution‟ has focused on change through flexibility, with consequent affects on 
product creation, production and life cycle.  
The main drivers of this development are the pressures of cost recovery which, 
together with intense competition, has led car-makers to seek economies of scale by 
increasing production volumes, standardising platforms and components and 
outsourcing „non-core‟ activities. In addition, increasing regulatory pressures and 
consumer demands for quality and capability have led to the development of new 
technologies for more efficient powertrains, reduced weight, hybrid/electric vehicles 
and bio-fuels, as well as high value electrical, electronic and communications 
componentry. Finally, market pressures have led to the growth of new segments, such 
as minivans or small „city‟ cars, and the need to offer increasing numbers of radical 
variations whilst still maintaining common „under-skin‟ platforms.  
One result of these developments is too much overall assembly capacity, with around 
25% under-utilisation in Western Europe and more than 30% in the developing 
markets of Central and Eastern Europe. Thus the weakest firms are under intense 
pressure and although MGR was the first to go under others have also struggled. For 
example, Fiat was in such difficulties that GM paid $1.5 billion in a divorce 
settlement in 2005 (although new model launches have since helped the company). 
More recently Peugeot Citroen has seen disappointing sales and declining profits such 
that in late 2007 the company announced 8,000 job cuts across Europe. A second 
outcome has been the rising costs of new model development. In contrast with what is 
expected under the „life cycle‟ model of industry development, the „crisis of cost 
recovery‟ facing firms has intensified over time. In today‟s prices, the cost of getting a 
 3 
genuinely new model to market lies somewhere between £400 million and £1 billion. 
As a result, large scale production over different models and brands using a platform 
sharing approach is vital to generate the cash for future model development, yet at the 
same time carries with it the risk of diluting brand image, as evidenced by Jaguar‟s 
problems with X-type model, which shared the same platform with the Ford Mondeo 
and Mazda 6.
4
 
 
Simultaneously, major manufacturers are developing assembly operations in low cost 
locations in emerging markets such as central/eastern Europe, or the southern states of 
the US. Indeed, as well as declining profitability, a key factor in the recent decision by 
Peugeot-Citroën to close its Ryton plant near Coventry with 2,300 immediate job 
losses was the opening of a new plant in Slovakia where labour costs are around one 
quarter those in Britain. Once the decision was taken to expand capacity in Eastern 
Europe, Ryton was particularly exposed for a number of reasons. Firstly, it was a 
small plant assembling only the Peugeot 206 from parts brought in from France and 
secondly cutting each job in France would have been up to three times as expensive.  
(Bailey and Cowling, 2006). The UK‟s flexible labour markets make it as easy to 
destroy jobs as to create them and the lack of significant domestically-owned 
manufacturing means that activities in Britain are exposed when transnationals look to 
cut auto assembly capacity.  
 
Restructuring at a Local Level 
With the collapse of MG Rover, and the closure of the Ryton plant, volume assembly 
in the region has in effect ended. Remaining activity is high-value luxury branded 
niche-production under the current control of Ford, notably Land Rover and Jaguar in 
Birmingham/Solihull, with smaller scale production by a newly-independent Aston 
Martin at Gaydon and at a range of other less known but still significant producers 
such as LDV Vans (commercial vehicles), Morgan and Westfield (sports cars) and 
Carbodies (taxis).  However, much of the „old‟ high volume supply matrix still 
remains with manufacturing concentrated in the main conurbations. 
 
With losses of over $12 billion in 2006, Ford announced in 2007 its intention to sell 
Jaguar and Land Rover, prompting fears about further capacity cuts and the future of 
17,000 Jaguar and Land Rover jobs if a private equity firm acquires them (although at 
the time of writing, the Indian firm Tata seems the most likely buyer). Meanwhile, 
Nanjing Auto has plans to re-start small-scale MG sports car assembly at Longbridge 
in late 2007 with complete ´knock-down‟ kits shipped in from China (although 
eventual production volumes are uncertain). Longer term there is much scepticism 
over Nanjing‟s ability to develop new models and their commitment to production in 
the West Midlands, especially given plans to produce and develop models in 
Oklahoma. However, the takeover in late 2007 of Nanjing by the larger state-owned 
Chinese firm Shanghai may offer more hope in this regard, given Shanghai‟s much 
larger size and its commitment to R&D activities in the region through its joint 
venture with Ricardo.  
 
Amongst first tier suppliers there has also been a process of concentration and 
specialisation around global players, a process accelerated by recent takeover activity. 
In the West Midlands this leaves first tier firms such as GKN (drivelines), Dana 
(axles), Bosch (lighting),  Delphi (engine management), Johnson Controls (air 
conditioning and heating), Faurecia (seating), Lear (seating and interiors), Denso 
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(starters and alternators), TRW (steering, and safety systems), Rockwell (chassis,) and 
Siemens-VDO (instrumentation). Significant second tier suppliers include Sarginsons 
Precision Components and Zeus (aluminium castings), Brandaur (pressings), 
Radshape (sheet metal forming) and Premier Stampings (die forgings) amongst many 
others.   
 
The cluster is underpinned by research, consultancy and support organisations 
including Ricardo (engine and drivetrain), Prodrive (performance engineering and 
motor sport) MIRA (research development and testing centre), the Warwick 
Manufacturing Group, and the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders (SMMT) 
Industry Forum.  The region also benefited from the decision by Ford in 2006 to 
invest £1 billion in research and development into cleaner technology and hybrid 
engines, with significant funding coming to Ford‟s development centres at Gaydon 
and Whitley, although there are question marks as to the future if Ford sells Jaguar 
and Land Rover. Finally, a joint R&D venture („Ricardo 2010‟) between Ricardo and 
Shanghai continues to develop the model initially envisaged as the replacement for 
the Rover 45, reflecting the on-going R&D strengths of the region‟s auto cluster 
despite the MGR collapse.  Strengths also remain in engine production and research, 
as evidenced by the number of patents in this area and BMW‟s investment in its Hams 
Hall engine plant near Birmingham. 
  
Not surprisingly, despite recent plant closures, the West Midlands is still seen as the 
core of the British automotive industry with some 53,000 jobs (ABI, 2005) under the 
NACE (EU) industry classification code for motor vehicle and component 
manufacture, (approximately 30% of the UK total, and around 6% of regional GVA 
(EMCC, 2004). Local activity includes the manufacture of electrical equipment, 
around half UK tyre production and some 20% of jobs in processing and shaping 
glass (e.g. windscreens) as well as retail sales and the distribution of spares and parts 
(often more profitable than assembly itself)  (DTI, 2001).  The metal, plastics and 
rubber products clusters also support the industry and a significant proportion of jobs 
in the wider manufacturing sector are also automotive related. The industry has also 
been a major focus for inward investment over the last decade, with nearly 40% of all 
jobs created by FDI being in auto or auto-related industries (RTF, 2000).   
 
However, recent assembly plant closures and job losses in the components industry 
have had a major impact. Indeed, from 1998-2005 employment in the region under 
NACE Code 34 declined by 32% compared with a 23% decline in Great Britain as a 
whole. (ABI, 2005).
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 In a sense every maturing economy witnesses a shift from 
manufacturing to services and therein a process of natural „de-industrialisation‟, with 
a fall in manufacturing‟s share in total employment  (Rowthorn and Wells, 1987).  
However, using Rowthorn and Wells‟ (1987) classification, we can differentiate 
between „positive‟ and „negative‟ variants of de-industrialisation.  The „positive‟ type 
is associated with the „normal‟ process of industrial dynamism in a „developed‟ 
economy, where rapid manufacturing productivity growth releases workers who are 
absorbed by an expanding service sector. Major auto manufacturers, for example, 
generally operate on the basis of 5% productivity rise per year. In this positive 
scenario, unemployment remains low and is frictional in nature as workers search 
and/or retrain for new service sector employment in an expanding economy where 
real incomes are rising.  In contrast, the „negative‟ variety is a sign of economic 
distress; manufacturing is in difficulty and displaced workers are unable to take up 
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employment in the service sector.  This is associated with rising unemployment and 
the stagnation of real incomes.  Whilst unemployment in the West Midlands is just 
below the UK average at around 5.3% (on a Labour force survey measure), in 
Birmingham it remains significantly higher, at around 7.5%. In this sense the auto 
sector and manufacturing more generally have exhibited sighs of both types of de-
industrialisation. 
 
An Inter-Regional Network? 
Whilst centred in the West Midlands, the „cluster‟ connections clearly extend to 
adjacent English regions and Wales. For example, in 2001 there were over 40,000 
employees in the neighbouring East Midlands region with some 9,000 in auto 
assembly (including the Toyota plant at Burnaston) and 8,000 in manufacturing parts 
and accessories.  Another 20,000 were employed in manufacturing autos, parts and 
accessories in the South East region (plus 1,600 in the motor sport cluster); 13,000 the 
South West (which includes the Honda plant at Swindon); 12,000 in Wales (suppliers 
for Honda and engine manufacturing for Ford and Toyota); and 24,000 in the North 
West (15,000 in motor vehicle assembly via GM and Jaguar/Land Rover in 
Merseyside, VW Bentley at Crewe and Congleton and Paccar trucks in Leyland, and 
9,000 in manufacturing parts and components). Whilst the North West is seen by the 
DTI (2001) as a „distinct‟ cluster, component manufacturing is under-represented, 
indicating supply from elsewhere (notably the West Midlands), and that these are 
inter-related clusters or even part of a single national cluster. This has implications for 
the region given, for example, recent uncertainty over GM production at the Vauxhall 
plant at Ellesmere Port.
6
  If a West Midlands „cluster‟ can be identified, in reality it 
forms part of an inter-regional or national auto network extending into several other 
regions. Indeed, the transfer of some Land Rover production by Ford from 
Birmingham to its Halewood plant on Merseyside, and the sourcing of engines by 
Ford from Wales and by BMW from Birmingham for MINI production in Oxford are 
all indicative of the inter-linkages across administrative regions. 
 
Diversity and Challenges to the WM Auto „Cluster‟ 
The diversity of component manufacturing in the region is a strength that enables it to 
supply a wide range of products, as noted by Tilson (1997) a decade ago. At that time 
many component manufacturers were dependent on local assemblers, with 70% 
selling their products in the region (ibid; RTF, 2000). With the decline in volume 
production, suppliers have had to seek markets elsewhere. In this regard, the 
interconnected nature of the industry and the reach of purchasing provide 
opportunities. However, most local activities are in the traditional mechanically based 
areas of vehicle engineering with relatively little involvement in the new high value 
electronic and electrical componentry making up an increasing proportion of the value 
of a new car (EMCC, 2004). The lack of a significant „home owned‟ electronics or 
telemetry industry puts the region, and the UK as a whole, at a disadvantage.   
 
Tilson (1997) also found, perhaps unsurprisingly, that many companies were 
experiencing reduced profits through downward pressure on costs from the vehicle 
makers and major suppliers. The so-called „lean paradigm‟ which seeks to sqeeze out 
costs and improve productivity has since intensified, leading to significant 
consolidation at all levels in the supply matrix. Thus only those companies able to 
innovate and adapt are able to survive.  However, firms‟ differing levels of 
competencies are not only reflected in their technological and organisational 
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trajectories, but also in the way they are networked, engage in collaboration, the 
markets they serve and their openness beyond the cluster. Tully and Berkeley (2004), 
drawing on Gordon and McCann‟s work on cluster types, identify three groupings of 
firms in the West Midlands auto „cluster‟. The first (30% of the sample) does not 
cooperate or interact with competitors or customers, reflecting a „pure agglomeration 
model‟. Firms here are atomistic, and their co-location is in line with a Marshallian 
view of urban-based firms co-locating to access labour, infrastructure and a flow of 
ideas and information. The second group (45%) cooperates up and down the supply 
chain, with more sophisticated, stable and long-term relationships with customers and 
suppliers underpinned by OEM-driven schemes to drive up quality and productivity. 
A final group (25%) also collaborates with competitors and agencies in a Granovetter 
type „social network model‟, characterised by trust and a lack of opportunism. This 
group encompasses more complex interpersonal relationships, reflecting a recognised 
need to work together for common, beneficial goals. As Tully and Berkeley (2004) 
stress, the more sophisticated a firm‟s relationships, the more positive is their outlook, 
the more informed they are about market trends and the more likely they are to have 
links with universities. Such firms also invest more in new technologies, have better 
extra-regional links, and are more likely to be market leaders. They are also more 
likely to have shifted from high volume, low-value standardised production towards 
higher value, customised and design-led niche activity. Given the structural changes 
in the industry, such strategic moves are seen by many as vital for firms to survive yet 
are also risky. As Donnelly et al (2005) highlight, many regionally-based SMEs “lack 
the capacity to upgrade their skills, processes or R&D capacities on their own”, noting 
that “outside assistance is required otherwise many small firms will fail”.  
 
Modularisation, post „Japanisation‟ and the end of a „Geography of Proximity‟? 
These global trends threaten established local production systems such as in the West 
Midlands. Under the „lean manufacturing‟ model OEMs demand high „QCD‟ (quality, 
cost and delivery) performance and deal with fewer suppliers to ease coordination 
costs in managing the supply chain (in effect passing these to first tier suppliers). The 
overall effect has been to force suppliers to become „world class‟, leading to a wave 
of consolidation similar to that for OEMS, with first tier suppliers taking on greater 
R&D roles (Bergner, 2000) and, in some cases, responsibility for whole systems (e.g., 
drives or steering), modules (e.g., interiors, „front ends‟ or „corners‟) or even 
assembly work
7
, as witnessed, for example, at Jaguar‟s Birmingham facility where 
assembly of the aluminium XJ model is undertaken in a joint venture with Stadco. In 
turn they exert greater power over lower level suppliers (McIvor et al, 1998) as they 
themselves outsource a range of design and development functions. Thus a „post-
Japanisation‟ phase characterised as „at supplier cost‟ is emerging where innovative 
capability is required at all levels in the value chain (see Wells and Rawlinson, 1994). 
In addition, the internationalisation of component sourcing by assemblers has 
accelerated (Sadler, 1999; RTF, 2000). Thus, GKN, the region‟s largest auto business, 
has more than 80% of purchasing outside the UK, BMW shifted £1 billion of Rover‟s 
£4 billion annual components spend out of Britain (Financial Times, 24/6/99; 
27/04/02), and even MGR was planning significant sourcing from China before its 
collapse. Of course modularisation, and the outsourcing of bulky components, 
inevitably results in major suppliers setting up in geographic proximity to the vehicle 
makers. Thus the list of major suppliers is replicated in most automotive regions 
including where there is new assembly capacity in Central and Eastern Europe, China 
and India. However, component sourcing for these plants enables low cost imports to 
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Western Europe and changes the supply „filiere‟ (Lagendijk, 1997). Those West 
Midlands firms that concentrate on high volume, single material and single process 
parts are at risk in this scenario.  As Larsson (2002) notes, first tier suppliers may 
have little incentive to source components locally for the modules they prepare.  
  
The key points to emerge from this brief overview of the industry and ´cluster´ are 
threefold. Firstly, increasingly global sourcing, and a shift to lower wage cost 
locations, threatens established „clusters‟ such as the West Midlands, making a cluster 
policy in this area simultaneously more necessary but more difficult to sustain. The 
ending of volume car production in the West Midlands through the collapse of MGR 
and the closure of the Peugeot plant and the shift to smaller scale higher-value 
production is itself evidence of this. Secondly, even major firms are under intense 
pressure given the rising costs of new model development, necessitating large scale 
production, platform sharing strategies and/or joint ventures in order to survive. 
Thirdly, at the local level, the West Midlands cluster ranges from low-tech „metal 
bashing‟ to high-tech composite materials, engines and environmental technologies, 
with a series of interlinked networks ranging from local supply to global supply 
chains dominated by the big players. However, as we have highlighted a number of 
technological and organisational trends pose both opportunities and threats and raise a 
number of crucial points about the role for policy. 
 
3.  MG ROVER: A BRIEF ANATOMY OF FAILURE 
At the time of its collapse in 2005 MGR was producing just over 100,000 units a year 
when it needed to be in the 2-3 million range to generate enough cash for new model 
development. Not surprisingly, much media attention focused on the short-term 
failure of the Phoenix management over the proceeding five years and the tiny size of 
the firm.  However, from a wider perspective MGR can be viewed as the 
unsustainable rump of a government-created giant which never sufficiently integrated 
activities and which was never in a position to recover the rising costs of new model 
development. Its long-term decline and ultimate collapse is tied up in a complex 
vortex of long-running and inter-related factors, including macro-economic 
instability, the particular short-termism of British finance-industry relations, 
fratricidal industrial relations, misguided government policy interventions, and above 
all the firm‟s perennial inability to generate the cash needed for new model 
development (Williams et al, 1994). As noted, this „crisis of cost recovery‟ has 
actually intensified over time.  
 
Long-Running Problems and the Failure of a „National Champion‟ 
MG Rover itself was the remnant of a government creation of the 1950s and 1960s, 
the British Leyland Motor Corporation (BLMC, later BL, Austin Rover and finally 
Rover). As Williams et al dryly observed, the name often changed but the underlying 
problems remained the same (Williams et al, 1994a).  The firm was brought together 
by the government in effect merging smaller auto manufacturers (Austin, Morris, 
Triumph, Rover and Jaguar
8
) through various stages into a single firm, in probably the 
most prominent and infamous example of the misguided policy of creating so-called 
„national champions‟.  As Owen (1999) commented, the merger “was a mistake both 
in concept and in execution, reflecting a naïve belief in the advantages of size and in 
the ability of charismatic individuals to revive declining companies”.  Rather than a 
„champion‟, a mega-merger was forced on reluctant and resistant incumbent 
managers. Not surprisingly, suspicion and rivalry across brands hampered efforts to 
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integrate activities, share high-value components and to strip-out costs leading to 
continued loss-making.  This inability to recover development costs, or the ´cycle of 
doom´ as Holweg and Oliver (2005) term it, went back to the 1950s and 1960s, and 
plagued the firm across decades.  After the oil-price shock of the early 1970s, 
nationalisation in 1975 cost the government, and British taxpayers, billions of pounds 
in subsidies which went in buying industrial relations peace and limited new model 
development.   
 
By 1978, the then Austin Rover still assembled over 600,000 units, and exported 40% 
of them. Its UK market share (for Austin, Morris, Rover and Triumph) was 23.5%, or 
almost a quarter of all cars sold in the UK that year (Williams et al, 1987). Exports 
collapsed after this point, however, and never recovered, falling from 40% of Austin 
Rover output to just 20% in the mid 1980s when the firm assembled around 300,000 
cars.  This export collapse was linked to the ending of assembly operations by Austin 
Rover on the continent and the high value of sterling during the early 1980s. Under 
Thatcher, the company was privatised in 1985 through a sale to British Aerospace 
(BAe) which was diversifying away from aircraft.  After the failure of its regional jet 
business, BAe sold Rover to BMW for £800 million.  As Hutton (1999) noted, the 
sale of Rover to a foreign firm reflected the twin factors of British short-termism 
(BAe‟s desire for cash) and the openness of British industry and government to 
penetration by foreign investment.  Thereby Rover became part of BMW, but 
probably for the „wrong‟ reasons.  BAe needed cash and BMW wanted the four wheel 
drive Land Rover division - as at that time the company did not have the resources to 
develop its own model to compete in an expanding market segment - and also to 
double production volume (at the time both had annual sales of around 440,000.) At 
the time many commentators recognised the difficulties of achieving economies of 
scale whilst the cars were so different in design and driveline (Bailey et al, 1994).  
Although some criticism has also been levelled at the government‟ s failure to heed 
these warnings it is noteworthy that the Rover Management Board were in favour of a 
BMW purchase since there was an historic connection between the companies
9
 and 
they saw the possibility of joining BMW in the profitable premium segment. 
 
Life under BMW: The „English Patient‟ 
Whatever the precise reasons for BMW‟s acquisition, problems were immediately 
apparent. Rover under government and then BAe ownership had relied heavily on a 
joint venture (JV) with Honda through which Honda designs were badged and sold as 
Rovers to European markets, saving Rover considerable R&D costs and periodically 
enabling it to make modest profits. Honda executives were unimpressed when Rover 
was abruptly sold to a competitor, and Honda subsequently sold its 20% stake. As 
commentators warned at the time, it was not clear what BMW would actually make 
after the JV with Honda was terminated. Thus, although one joint Honda-Rover 
model programme, the Honda Civic - Rover 400/45 continued into production, BMW 
was now on its own.   As observed by Williams et al (1994a), BMW did not have the 
capacity to develop the Rover brand and style of car and therefore jobs were at risk. 
Logic suggested that, since the UK was the company‟s second market after Germany, 
the BMW -3 series should be made at Longbridge. However, concerns about quality 
and worries about dilution of the BMW brand prevented this ever happening.  
 
Not surprisingly, through a combination of model obsolescence (as BMW struggled to 
bring on line new models), marketing mistakes, and macro-economic factors such as 
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the rise in the value of sterling, Rover sales declined and losses grew to £500 million 
a year by the late 1990s.  Whilst BMW invested heavily in the Land Rover plant at 
Solihull (Birmingham) and at Cowley (Oxford), the position of Longbridge was 
always vulnerable, with BMW threatening early on to switch production of the new 
MINI elsewhere if productivity did not improve and deals on working conditions were 
not agreed (Bailey, 2003). Similarly, in March 1999 BMW threatened to shift 
production to Hungary if a state aid package was not agreed by the government to 
build a new model, the R30.  A £152 million subsidy package was agreed with the 
government in mid-1999 in return for a planned £1.7 billion investment by BMW in 
Longbridge. After a complaint by Porsche, however, the European Commission 
decided to investigate the aid package under EU state-aid rules. Before the prolonged 
investigation was finished, however, BMW announced in March 2000 that it was 
pulling out, leading to the buy-out by Phoenix. 
 
It was clear to several commentators (Williams et al, 1994; Bailey et al, 1994) that 
BMW‟s purchase of Rover in 1994 was a corporate mistake for BMW and likely to 
cause severe problems for Rover.
10
  As Wolf later commented (Financial Times, 
22/03/99), “BMW did not realise how bad a buy Rover would be”.  The „failure‟ of 
competition policy contributed to this problem by allowing BMW to buy Rover when 
it was clear to many that it was an inappropriate owner (Bailey et al, 1994).  It is 
widely accepted that local production systems can be improved by firms - whether 
domestic or foreign - that bring new technology and investment but can also be 
damaged through takeovers (Harrison, 1994).  Whilst BMW was seen by many as an 
inappropriate owner at the time of its takeover of Rover, Volkswagen (which had 
earlier shown interest) might have been much more suitable in that it could have 
extended its strategy of sharing platforms across brands to MGR as worked so well 
with VW, Audi, Seat and Skoda. It should be stressed that the case here is not anti-
inward investment per se but rather focuses on the suitability of acquiring firms 
(whether domestic or foreign) for the local production system.  None of this, of 
course, was considered by the government as the only perceived role for intervention 
was on a narrow competition basis. 
 
Not surprisingly, despite the substantial investment in the late 1990s, BMW decided 
in 2000 to break up the company, selling Land-Rover to Ford, retaining the Cowley 
factory in Oxford (for the new MINI) and the Hams Hall engine plant and selling the 
remaining Rover division with its Longbridge factory for a symbolic £10 to the 
Phoenix consortium. Despite the hopes raised in 2000, BMW‟s withdrawal left MGR 
virtually dead on its feet. The cancellation of the R30 project, which was the key mid-
sized model being developed under BMW as a replacement for the R45 meant that a 
whole cycle of model development had been missed (Holweg and Oliver, 2005). The 
firm was now brutally exposed as its aged model line became increasingly 
unattractive to buyers and it had only a very limited time horizon in which to find a 
partner; by 2002/3 it was clear to many that the firm was running out of time (Bailey, 
2003). The unsustainable position of the firm was evidenced by the way it consumed 
what assets it had. 
 
Exchange Rate Volatility 
Another view is that BMW acquired Rover not only for its 4WD competencies but 
also to obtain a manufacturing base “in a country which had lower labour costs than 
Germany and… a stable labour relations climate” (Owen, 1999). Any such relative 
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unit labour cost advantage was soon eliminated by the sustained and marked 
appreciation in the value of sterling from 1994 onwards.  At the time of the takeover 
in 1994, sterling was valued in the range DM2.40 – 2.50, making auto assembly in the 
UK attractive to firms such as BMW.  BMW budgeted for a turnaround plan at Rover 
with sterling at around DM2.90, yet by January 2000 sterling had risen to DM3.20, 
and Church (1999) estimated that by July 1999 the Sterling effective exchange rate 
was overvalued by around 20%. This over-appreciation exacerbated Rover‟s 
problems, making exports (of increasingly aged models) extremely difficult at a time 
when the company was losing home sales and trying to re-orientate its sales towards 
export markets.   
 
Such exchange rate volatility continues to make conditions for the region‟s 
manufacturers extremely difficult and has accelerated the shift to sourcing overseas, 
as Bailey (2007) notes. At the time of writing, Sterling is at a twenty-six year high 
against the dollar of over $2. This weak dollar makes selling to the US very difficult 
and has impacted severely on firms such as Jaguar as over a half of its sales are in the 
US market, especially for the large XJ model.  As much as a half of Ford‟s Premier 
Auto Group‟s losses in recent years could be down to this exchange rate issue. This 
exchange rate pressure accelerates the trend towards smaller-scale luxury branded 
production as noted in section two.  More broadly, cluster policies and development 
goals in a manufacturing-orientated region can be undermined by such major 
exchange rate fluctuations.  There may be good reasons for Britain remaining outside 
of the Eurozone, but the ´cost´ of exchange rate volatility has not gone away, and 
MGR´s most recent difficulties are a stark illustration of this – the story could have 
been quite different in the absence of such sterling over-appreciation. Indeed, the 
reduction of exchange rate risk through Euro membership could be a significant 
benefit to auto assemblers based in the UK, although this would not help Jaguar and 
Land Rover in selling to the key US market. 
 
Phoenix: An Unsustainable Strategy 
On taking over in 2000, the Phoenix management set four strategic objectives for the 
firm: maintaining production at 200,000 units, bringing a new model to market (the 
replacement for the medium-sized R45); finding a partner for new model 
development; and returning to profit.  But with a limited and aging product range, and 
in particular the lack of models in key growth segments (such as compact cars, people 
carriers and sports utility vehicles), this was always going to be a huge challenge.  
Whilst sales held up reasonably well in 2000, thereafter they declined rapidly and by 
2002/3 it became increasingly clear to commentators that the firm had limited time in 
which to find a partner to bring new models to market (Bailey, 2003).  
 
Some imaginative re-badging of aged Rover designs as MGs bought a little time, but 
over the next few years MGR sold off its only real assets (land, the profitable parts 
business and finance arm and later its intellectual property rights) in an increasingly 
desperate attempt to keep going.  By 2004, output had dwindled to around 115,000 
units and R&D spending had dried up. No partnership deal had been delivered other 
than an agreement with Tata to supply the small „City Rover‟ model – which was 
marketed at an uncompetitive price and failed to sell in significant numbers. With 
limited room for manouevre in that many of the big players had already entered 
partnership deals, it became clear that the very survival of MGR depended on a deal 
with Shanghai Automotive to jointly develop models. However, Shanghai became 
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increasingly concerned about the financial viability of MGR and feared picking up 
sizeable redundancy and pensions liabilities and talks dragged on for several months 
before ending in failure in April 2005. At that point the firm was forced into 
administration, with the remaining assets later bought for £60 million by Nanjing, 
another Chinese firm.  All but two production lines, along with the Powertrain engine 
production plant, were then stripped out from Longbridge in a „lift and shift‟ move to 
China.  
 
New Hopes or False Dawn? 
Nanjing aimed to re-start small scale production of MG TF sports cars at Longbridge 
in late 2007, with complete knock-down kits being imported from China. However, 
production has been delayed given quality concerns, and to-date only a very limited 
number have been made. The eventual production volume is as yet unclear and likely 
to be far smaller than the 100,000 units a year initially suggested by Nanjing at the 
time of takeover. Thus whilst of considerable significance in terms of redeveloping 
the Longbridge site, only „a few hundred‟ jobs at best will be created.  Initially it 
seemed that there would also be no substantial R&D centre, with the latter likely to be 
located at Nanjing‟s new MG plant in Oklahoma.  This represented something of a 
missed opportunity when compared with what was potentially on offer from a 
Shanghai Auto takeover of MGR. More recent developments look more promising, 
however. Shanghai Auto (which brought the intellectual property rights to the Rover 
25 and 75 and the replacement model for the R45 in development at the time of the 
MGR collapse) has developed a joint venture with Ricardo to develop the new model.  
Nanjing has also reversed its previously announced strategy and has stated that it will 
bring its R&D base to Longbridge. Most recently, in late 2007, Shanghai acquired the 
car making operations of Nanjing with Chinese government encouragement. This is 
likely to strengthen the likelihood of genuine R&D coming back to Longbridge.  Auto 
assembly (even if on a small scale) and R&D may be returning to Longbridge, albeit 
under Chinese state ownership. 
 
4.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
A number of technological and structural changes are unfolding in the auto industry, 
including: more rapid technological change which has driven up the costs of new 
model development, in turn increasing the pressure on firms to recover costs; more 
international sourcing of components with a greater role for larger first tier suppliers; 
and a shift of labour-intensive assembly operations towards lower cost locations as 
trade barriers have come down and as globalisation proceeds. All of these make 
maintaining the West Midlands cluster more challenging for firms and policy makers 
through cluster policy.  Manufacturers and policy makers are aware of the „threat‟ 
from low cost competitor locations in Central and Eastern Europe, and in the longer 
term, from India and China. At the same time, possibilities for cooperation are evident 
in the recent Shanghai-Ricardo R&D venture in the West Midlands. 
 
Within this broader context, MGR was the unprofitable rump of a former giant which 
for years had struggled to generate cash for new models owing in part to a lack of 
integration across the firm. The firm became reliant on Honda for new models in the 
1980s before being acquired by BMW. The latter‟s withdrawal from the firm in 2000 
left MGR virtually dead on its feet, and by 2002/3 it was clear to many that the firm 
was running out of time. Also significant in the firm‟s demise, however, were a 
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number of government policy mistakes over the years, including a misguided 
„national champions‟ approach, a failure to integrate activities under nationalisation, a 
mistaken privatisation, and the downside of competition policy which saw the sale to 
an inappropriate owner in BMW in the 1990s. Add in the considerable volatility of 
sterling and the scene was set for the firm‟s demise. The impact of this collapse and 
policy responses will be explored in papers in this issue. This will include a 
comparative analysis, comparing policy responses (see Thomas et al) and labour 
market outcomes (Armstrong et al) in the case of MGR in Birmingham and 
Mitsubishi in Adelaide.   
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
BAILEY, D. (2003) Globalisation, Regions and Cluster Policies: The Case of the 
Rover Task Force, Policy Studies, 2003, Vol.24, No.2/3. 
BAILEY, D. (2007) Globalisation and Restructuring in the Auto Industry: The Impact 
on the West Midlands Auto Cluster, Strategic Change, Vol.16, 2007, 137-144. 
BAILEY, D. & COWLING, K. (2006) The Lesson Peugeot has taught Britain, 
Parliamentary Brief, June 2006. 
BAILEY, D., HARTE, G. & SUGDEN, R. (1994) British Policy towards Inward 
Investment, Journal of World Trade, 1994. Vol. 28, No.2. 
BERGNER, R. (2000) Responding to the Challenges: Demands from Vehicle 
Manufacturers towards Suppliers are Ever-Increasing.  At: 
http://www.autoindustry.co.uk/library 
CHANARON, J.J. (2004) Relationships between the core and the periphery of the 
European automotive system, International Journal of Automotive Technology and 
Management.Vol 4, 2/3, 198-222. 
CHURCH, K.B. (1999) Properties of the Fundamental Exchange Rate in the Treasury 
Model, National Institute Economic Review, No.169, July 1999. 
CLARK, P. (2006) Superfactuals, Structural Repertoires and Productive Units; 
Explaining the Evolution of the British Auto industry, Competition and Change, 
Vol.10, No.4, 393-410. 
COFFEY, D. (2006)  The Myth of Japanese Efficiency. The World Car Industry in a 
Globalising Age. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY (DTI) (2001) Business Clusters in 
the UK – A First Assessment, Volumes 1 and 2.  London: The Stationary Office. 
DONNOLLY, T.S, BARNES & MORRIS, D. (2005) Restructuring the Automotive 
Industry in the English West Midlands, Local Economy, Vol.20, No.3, August 2005. 
THE ECONOMIST (2002) Incredible Shrinking Plants.  23/02/02: 99-101. 
EMCC (2004): The Automotive Sector at a Crossroads, Dublin: European Monitoring 
Centre on Change. 
FINANCIAL TIMES (1999) Rover Suppliers Warned to be More Competitive. 
24/6/99: 9. 
FINANCIAL TIMES (2002) Defiant Carmaker Foresees a Positive Route to the 
Future.  27/04/02: 3. 
HARRISON, B. (1994) Lean and Mean.  The Changing Landscape of Corporate 
Power in the Age of Flexibility.  New York: Basic Books. 
HOLWEG & OLIVER (2005) Who Killed MG Rover? Cambridge: The Cambridge-
MIT Institute. 
 13 
HUTTON, W. (1999) „Why Rover was driven out of UK Hands‟ in The Stakeholder 
Society.  Writings in Politics and Economics.  Oxford: Polity Press. 
LAGENDIJK, A. (1997) Towards an Integrated Automotive Industry in Europe: A 
“Merging Filiere” Perspective, European Urban and Regional Studies, Vol 4, No 1. 
LARSSEN, A. (2002) The Development and Regional Significance of the 
Automotive Industry: Supplier Parks in Western Europe, International Journal of 
Urban and Regional Research, Vol 26, No 4. 
MACNEILL, S. & CHANARON, J.J. (2005) Trends and Drivers of Change in the 
European Automotive Industry: Mapping the current situation, International Journal 
of Automotive Technology and Management, Vol. 5, 1, 83-106.  
MCIVOR, R.T., HUMPHREYS, P.K. & McALEER, W.E  (1998) European Car 
Makers and their Suppliers: Changes at the Interface, European Business Review, Vol 
98, No 2. 
ONS (Office of National Statistics) (2005) Annual Business Inquiry.  London: ONS. 
OWEN, G. (1999) From Empire to Europe.  The Decline and Revival of British 
industry Since the Second World War.  London: Harper Collins. 
ROVER TASK FORCE (RTF1) (2000) Final Report and Recommendations to the 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry.  Birmingham: Advantage West Midlands. 
ROWTHORN, B. & WELLS, J.R. (1987) Deindustrialisation and Foreign Trade. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
SADLER, D. (1999) Internationalization and Specialization in the European 
Automotive Components Sector: Implications for the Hollowing Out Thesis, Regional 
Studies, Vol 33, No2. 
TILSON, B.  (1997)  Survey of Firms in the Automotive Components Sector in the 
West Midlands Region.  Final Report for the West Midlands Development Agency.  
Birmingham: Centre for Urban and Regional Studies, The University of Birmingham.   
TULLY, J. & BERKELEY, N. (2004) Visualising the Operating Behaviour of SMEs 
in Sector and Cluster: Evidence form the West Midlands, Local Economy, Vol.19, 
No.1.   
WELLS, P. & RAWLINSON, M. (1994) The New European Automobile Industry, 
New York: St Martin‟s Press. 
WILLIAMS, K., WILLIAMS, J. & HASLAM, C. 1987. The Breakdown of Austin 
Rover, Berg. 
WILLIAMS, K., HASLAM, C., JOHAL, S. & WILLIAMS, J. (1994).  Cars.  
Analysis, History, Cases, Providence: Berghahn Books. 
WILLIAMS, K., HASLAM, C. & JOHAL, S. (1994a).  Who‟s Responsible?  BAe: 
BMW: Honda: Rover, A Public Interest Report from the Centre for empirical 
Research in Accounting and Finance, University of Manchester, and the Business 
Policy Unit, East London Business School, University of East London. 
WOMACK, J.P., JONES, D.T. & ROOS, D. (1990). The Machine that Changed the 
World, New York: Rawson Associates. 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Birmingham Business School, UK, Graduate School of Business, Nihon University, 
Tokyo, and Centre for Urban and Regional Studies, University of Birmingham 
respectively. The authors wish to acknowledge the support of the ESRC under award 
number RES-000-22-2478. contact: d.g.bailey@bham.ac.uk  
2
 Coffey (2006) is critical of what he terms the „myth of Japanese efficiency‟. 
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3
 See Clark (2006) who draws on Abernathy‟s work highlighting the unexpected and 
significant increase in the level of innovation at Ford in the 1960s.  
4
 A key issue for the future is what effect the anticipated shift to more specialised 
„short-run‟ production, including electric/hybrid powered autos, will have on 
development costs, minimum efficient scales and the players involved. 
5
 Taking a broad definition of the filiere to include auto-related industries gave a 
figure of around 120,000 people in 2001, higher than the 100,000 figure given in RTF 
(2000). More recently, Donnelly et al (2005) put the numbers of workers in the 
broadly-defined auto industry in the region as low as 65,000. If correct, this would 
signify as many as 35,000 job losses over 2000-2005. 
6
 Although in 2007 GM announced that the new model would be assembled there, 
safeguarding 2,200 direct jobs and more in the supply chain. 
7
 Bergner (2000) notes that between 1988 and 1998 the global number of direct 
component suppliers to OEMs and the aftermarket shrank from 30,000 to 8,000.  This 
number is expected to fall considerably in the future.  For example, McIvor et al 
(1998) argue that 50% of European suppliers will cease to exist in their current form 
owing to pressure from OEMs to reduce costs and innovate. 
8
 Jaguar was separated and privatised in the 1980s, acquired by Ford in 1989 and sold 
again to Ford‟s US parent in 1991, later being sold to the Indian conglomerate Tata in 
2008. 
9
 For example, in the 1920s BMW had manufactured versions of the Austin 7 under 
licence.  
10
 Although BMW was able to access Land Rover‟s four wheel drive (4WD) 
technology and was later able to produce its own 4WD models. 
 
 
 
 
